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Abstract: 
 
Despite of the acknowledged individual importance of both entry mode and knowledge transfer, 
the interaction between these two issues has rarely been studied. In this paper we set out to 
examine the impact of entry mode, i.e. greenfield investments and acquisitions, on outward 
knowledge transfer from a subsidiary unit to other parts of the MNC. Additionally, we explore 
the impact of time elapsed on outward knowledge transfer. We test our hypotheses on a sample 
of 159 western majority owned subsidiaries located in Finland and China. The results of our 
study suggest that outward knowledge transfer is greater in subsidiaries established through 
acquisition than through greenfield investment. We also find that outward knowledge transfer 
increases with time both in acquisitions and greenfield investments although the underlying 
reasons for the increase are likely to differ across entry modes. 
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INTRODUCTION
One of the major challenges MNCs face is exploiting locally created subsidiary knowledge at a 
global level by means of internal cross-border knowledge transfer. Transferring knowledge inter-
nally is today considered as one of the most important competitive advantages of MNCs (Ghoshal, 
1987; Gupta and Govindarajan, 1991, 2000; Kogut and Zander, 1993). Another crucial issue for 
MNCs is determining the entry mode through which they establish a new subsidiary. 
Despite of the acknowledged individual importance of both of entry mode and knowledge 
transfer the interaction between these two issues has rarely been studied. Past literature on knowl-
edge transfer has explored a variety of factors affecting the transfer process including the influence 
of different knowledge characteristics on the knowledge transfer process (Nonaka, 1994; Simonin, 
1999), motivational factors such as knowledge sharing hostility (Husted and Michailova, 2002) 
and the relationship between sending and receiving units (Szulanski, 1996); as well as the effect 
of cultural differences on the knowledge transfer process (Kedia and Bhagat, 1988). Literature on 
entry mode has mainly concentrated on factors determining the choice between different modes 
of entry (Brouthers and Brouthers, 2001; Barkema and Vermeulen, 1998; Hennart and Park, 
1993).
However, considerably less attention has been directed at examining the actual impact of 
different entry modes on knowledge transfer within the MNC. Knowledge transfer may not be the 
decisive factor when making the entry mode decision concerning a certain subsidiary. However, 
the entry mode decision may have an impact on subsequent knowledge transfer from that sub-
sidiary to other units of the MNC and this is an issue that deserves to be further examined.
There are also additional reasons for exploring the impact of entry mode on knowledge 
transfer in greater depth. Although some studies (Foss and Pedersen, 2002) have touched upon 
the relevance of entry mode on knowledge transfer, entry mode has mostly been of secondary 
importance in these studies and included only as a control variable. Furthermore, the results of 
previous empirical studies are somewhat contradictory. Studies on the post-acquisition integration 
process have drawn attention to problems relating to knowledge transfer from acquired units 
(Ranft and Lord, 2002), whereas other studies have highlighted the value of acquired units as 
potential knowledge providers for the rest of the MNC (Gupta and Govindarajan, 2000). 
The purpose of this paper is to shed further light on this under explored issue. Hence, our 
primary objective is to study the impact of different entry modes on outward knowledge transfer 
from a subsidiary. We concentrate on knowledge transfer from a subsidiary established either as 
Authors note: We greatfully acknowledge the help of Ingmar Björkman, Susanna Taimitarha, Gunnar Rosenqvist, and 
Rebecca Piekkari. We also thank participants of the research project ”Managing knowledge creation, transfer and 
translation in multinational corporations: A Finnish perspective”. We are greatful for the generous financial help of 
the Academy of Finland and Liikesivistysrahasto.
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a greenfield investment or as an acquisition. Our decision to focus solely on these two modes of 
entry whilst excluding for instance joint ventures, is due to the reason that there has been less 
empirical research conducted on knowledge transfer under these entry modes (Bresman et al., 
1999). Furthermore, we go deeper in exploring this issue by also considering the impact of time 
elapsed since the subsidiary became a part of the MNC. 
Argote (1999) argues for additional studies to examine knowledge transfer in different inter-
national contexts. The main contribution of such studies would be to help explain differences in 
knowledge transfer patterns across organisations depending on context-specific factors, as well 
as to further understanding for the conditions under which knowledge transfer takes place. Our 
study contributes to the knowledge transfer discussion by doing precisely this. There are few 
studies exploring knowledge transfer in greenfields, and even fewer in the context of acquisitions 
(Bresman et al. 1999). 
Our study contributes to the knowledge transfer discussion the following way. First, we ex-
plore knowledge transfer in the context of greenfields and acquisitions, a context that has not 
been thoroughly explored in relation to knowledge transfer. In addition, our empirical data from 
Finland and China provides an additional contribution by showing that the influence of entry 
mode on outward knowledge transfer can be greater than the influence of home country. 
This shows that the importance of entry mode for outward knowledge transfer seems to be 
of more general nature and not entirely context bound. Furthermore, contrary to other studies we 
focused on entry mode as our main independent variable rather than only controlling for its effect 
on knowledge transfer. 
The paper is organized as follows. We start by presenting the theoretical background for our 
study and by defining our key concepts. After that we develop our hypotheses concerning the 
impact of entry mode on outward knowledge transfer from a subsidiary. Then we present our 
research design and the results of the regression analyses. Finally, we conclude by discussing the 
results, implications, and limitations of our study and suggest areas for future research. 
BACKGROUND
Defining key concepts
Before moving on to discuss knowledge transfer in greenfield investments and acquisitions we 
will first define the key concepts of our study. Following Grant (1996) we chose to define knowl-
edge simply as ”that which is known” while acknowledging that many types of knowledge are 
relevant to the firm and that knowledge can be found across various functions. In accordance 
with Argote and Ingram (2000) we define knowledge transfer as a process through which one unit 
is affected by the experience of another. This definition describes the fact that knowledge lives 
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and changes constantly and thus is not the same in all situations. In other words, knowledge 
transfer means applying existing knowledge in a different context than the one in which it has 
originated. 
Consistent with the resource-based and knowledge-based views of the firm (Barney, 1991; 
Grant, 1996) we conceptualise the MNC as a heterogeneous bundle of resources, of which 
knowledge is the most important one. In this paper subsidiary implies a majority owned (> 50% 
ownership) MNC unit located outside the home country of the MNC. Our focus is on subsidiaries 
established either through acquisition or greenfield investment. We define a greenfield investment 
as setting up a new venture from scratch (Barkema and Vermeulen, 1998). In line with Capron 
(1999), we define an acquisition as the acquisition by one company of another entire company, 
or of a business of an ongoing company. 
We will now move on to look at previous research within the entry mode and knowledge 
transfer streams of literature. 
Knowledge transfer in greenfield investments and acquisitions
A transaction cost theory perspective has been widely applied in previous research on acquisitions 
and greenfield investments (Hennart and Park, 1993). In addition, institutional and cultural vari-
ables such as level of foreign experience (Hennart and Park, 1993; Wilson 1980), R&D intensity, 
size of foreign direct investment in comparison to the investing company (Brouthers and Brouthers, 
2000; Hennart and Park, 1993), and cultural distance (Brouthers and Brouthers, 2000; Kogut and 
Singh, 1988) have also been included in previous studies. These studies have predominantly fo-
cused on reasons for choosing an acquisition type of entry mode over a greenfield investment 
and vice versa.
The implications of entry mode, i.e. greenfield investment or acquisition, on subsequent 
knowledge transfer between the new subsidiary and the rest of the MNC has not been widely 
explored in previous entry mode literature. The knowledge transfer literature on the other hand, 
touches on some of these issues but rarely in the context of acquisitions and greenfield invest-
ments. However, there are a few exceptions to this such as for instance the studies by Gupta and 
Govindarajan (2000) and Foss and Pedersen (2002). Although they both point to the importance 
of entry mode in connection to outward knowledge transfer neither takes entry mode as its pri-
mary object of focus.
Gupta and Govindarajan (2000) included entry mode in their operationalization of the 
concept ‘value of knowledge stock’, which they argued to have a positive impact on outward 
knowledge transfer. In their study entry mode was included as a part of a large model but was not 
really the focus of interest. Furthermore, the results of its impact on outward knowledge transfer 
differed depending on if the outflows were directed to peer subsidiaries or to the parent corpora-
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tion. Acquired subsidiaries were found to transfer more knowledge to peer subsidiaries than their 
greenfield counterparts whereas this was not the case concerning outward knowledge transfer to 
the parent corporation. Foss and Pedersen (2002) also found that entry mode had an impact on 
subsequent outward knowledge transfer from a subsidiary in the way that acquired subsidiaries 
engaged in more outward knowledge transfer than greenfield subsidiaries. 
Concerning factors that influence outward knowledge transfer from a subsidiary we limit 
ourselves to reviewing factors that can be expected to be of particular relevance in connection 
to the choice of entry mode. Thus, our focus lies on motivational and cultural factors rather than 
on knowledge related factors with the exception of an important knowledge characteristic; 
tacitness. 
Tacitness is one of the most commonly discussed barriers to internal knowledge transfer 
(Zander and Kogut 1995). Nonaka (1994) describes tacit knowledge as something that cannot be 
easily communicated and shared, is highly personal, and deeply rooted in action and in an indi-
vidual’s involvement within a specific context. In other words, separating such knowledge from 
the unit in possession of it in order to transfer it to another one is not always easy, especially as 
some aspects of a routine can be difficult to pinpoint and may even be performed subcon-
sciously. 
Tacit knowledge that is embedded in organizational structures, policies and procedures may 
be easier to transfer by greenfield investments since acquisitions often come with established 
structures and policies that can be difficult to change (Harzing, 2002). Hence, tacitness of knowl-
edge is more likely to be a problem for knowledge transfer in acquisitions than in greenfield in-
vestments. Nonetheless, it is often tacit knowledge that is most interesting for acquiring firms as 
it may be the key to ”how things are done here”, in other words it may be precisely what makes 
a certain unit valuable. One solution for this particular problem in acquisitions could be the use 
of an integration mode where the objective is to dissolve the boundary between the units. 
We move on from knowledge characteristics to discuss the importance of relationships for 
the knowledge transfer process. For instance inter-personal relationships between staff members, 
inter-unit relationships and relationships between organizations and their external counterparts 
are crucial in the process of knowledge transfer. Szulanski (1996) maintains that an arduous re-
lationship is one of the main causes for what he terms internal stickiness. It is conceivable that 
the likelihood of an arduous relationship between the subsidiary and other units of the MNC is 
greater in the case of acquisitions than in greenfields as acquisitions involve bringing together 
two previously separate organizations. 
An arduous relationship can, in turn, result in knowledge sharing hostility and in unwilling-
ness to collaborate. Bresman et al. (1999) argue that knowledge sharing only takes place when 
individuals possess a sense of shared identity or belonging with their colleagues. According to 
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Husted and Michailova (2002), individuals are inherently hostile to knowledge sharing. This may 
be accentuated by the fact that acquisitions are often stressful and unwelcome events for the 
people involved since they imply change and a great deal of uncertainty. Thus, people may feel 
reluctant to share their own knowledge, fearing redundancy if their specific know-how is too 
widely diffused. This is more likely to be the case during the early stages of the post-acquisition 
integration process, when uncertainty is high.
Cultural variations across nations and organizations can also be a major factor influencing 
the process of knowledge transfer (Child and Rodrigues, 1996; Kedia and Bhagat, 1988; Bhagat 
et al., 2002). In an international context national cultural differences are always present irrespec-
tive of the chosen entry mode. However, certain cultural factors may be heightened in an acqui-
sition context. Olie (1994) draws attention to the fact that cross-cultural acquisitions are likely to 
bring together people with different values and beliefs about the work place. Thus, a common 
frame of reference that may serve as a coordination mechanism is missing. Datta and Puia (1995) 
suggest that when national cultural differences are large the transfer of knowledge between the 
acquiring and acquired companies may be more difficult.
Cultural differences, the relationship between units as well as motivational issues such as 
knowledge sharing hostility are all examples of factors that are likely to have a stronger negative 
affect on the knowledge transfer process in acquisitions than in greenfield investments.
HYPOTHESES DEVELOPMENT
Based on the review of previous research within entry mode and knowledge transfer literature, 
we will now go on to develop our hypotheses. The review of past research on knowledge transfer 
under different entry modes illustrates that there are certain difficulties associated with the post-
acquisition integration process, which may complicate knowledge transfer from an acquired 
subsidiary. However, an acquisition mode of entry does also pose certain advantages related to 
outward knowledge transfer from the subsidiary. 
As opposed to greenfield investments, acquired subsidiaries come with an existing knowl-
edge stock. According to Prahalad and Hamel (1990), gaining access to new knowledge is often 
an important driver of an acquisition decision. Especially in cases where the target firm has a 
unique knowledge stock that is difficult or time-consuming to imitate, while speed of entry to the 
market is also important, acquisitions tend to be favoured over greenfield investments (Belderbos, 
2003). Hence, acquisitions can to some extent be seen as a substitute for own R&D (Hennart and 
Park, 1993). 
As Gupta and Govindarajan (2000) argue, the knowledge stock of an acquired firm is likely 
to be less duplicative relative to that of a greenfield investment. This would in turn motivate 
516
LTA  4 /05  •  R .  S A R A L A  A N D  J .  S U M E L I U S
knowledge transfer since knowledge worth sharing needs to exist in order for knowledge transfer 
to take place. Gupta and Govindarajan (2000) studied knowledge flows in MNCs and found that 
acquired subsidiaries engage in greater knowledge outflows to peer subsidiaries than greenfield 
investments. This study examines the differences in outward knowledge transfer in the entire MNC, 
i.e. from the subsidiary to both the peer subsidiaries and headquarters. 
We argue that the advantages of acquisitions as opposed to greenfield investments is stron-
ger when considering outward knowledge transfer subsequent to the establishment of a subsidiary 
and thus, we propose the following hypothesis:
Hypothesis 1. Outward knowledge transfer from an acquired subsidiary to other parts of 
the MNC will be greater than from a subsidiary started as a greenfield investment.
Besides depending on the entry mode, outward knowledge transfer may also be contingent on 
the time that the subsidiary has been in the MNC. The effect of time elapsed since the subsidiary 
became a part of the MNC can be expected to differ depending on if the subsidiary was acquired 
or established as a greenfield investment. The literature reports problems related to the first years 
of the acquisition whereas there are no similar problems reported concerning greenfield invest-
ments. 
This is due to the fact that the post-acquisition process may render outward knowledge 
transfer more difficult during the first years of the acquisition. Based on Haspeslagh and Jemison 
(1991), we define post-acquisition integration as a gradual, interactive process where two or-
ganizations learn to work together and cooperate in the transfer of strategic capabilities, includ-
ing knowledge. As Ranft and Lord (2002) argue, factors that make knowledge transfer difficult 
within an existing firm are likely to be heightened in an acquisition context because acquisition 
involves bringing together two previously separate organizations. Accordingly, Bresman et al. 
(1999), found empirical evidence that knowledge transfer in acquisitions was positively related 
to time elapsed since acquisition. 
In the literature, the acquisition integration process is usually reported to last up to five years 
after the acquisition takes place (Krug and Hegarty, 1997). In this time it is likely that the acquired 
company has been integrated to the extent considered desirable by the MNC and the previously 
separate organizations have learned to work together and cooperate in the transfer of knowledge. 
Therefore we assume that outward knowledge transfer from the acquired company will increase 
after five years have elapsed since the acquisition, and we propose the following hypothesis:
Hypothesis 2. Outward knowledge transfer from an acquired subsidiary will increase after 
5 years whereas there will be no such effect in greenfield investments.
In figure 1 below we illustrates the framework of our study. 
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RESEARCH METHODS
Sample and data collection
The data collection for this study was carried out during 2000–2002. Our target group consisted 
of Western MNCs located in Finland and China. These two countries were selected because they 
represent two very different locations for subsidiaries. Finland represents a small, developed 
Western country while China represents a large, emerging Asian country. We wanted to test our 
hypothesis in a sample of two countries that are very different from each other to see whether our 
hypotheses hold across these two countries. If subsidiary home country has no great influence to 
the results, it offers more evidence for the applicability of our hypothesis in general across differ-
ent countries than if we were using a one-country sample or a sample of two very similar coun-
tries. 
Originally we targeted the 150 largest foreign-owned subsidiaries in Finland whilst the cor-
responding number was 300 in China. The resulting sample was 164 subsidiaries, of which 89 
were located in Finland and 75 in China. Accordingly, the response rate for Finland was 59 per-
cent and the equivalent percentage for China was 25. The difference in the response rates between 
these two sub-sets of data was due to better access to companies in Finland than in China. 
After controlling for missing values, our final data consisted of 159 majority owned sub-
sidiaries out of which 89 were Finnish and 70 Chinese. Hence, the Finnish sample was somewhat 
bigger than the Chinese one. Concerning the entry mode, the total sample consisted of 87 green-
field invesments and 72 acquisitions. In the Finnish sub sample the respective figures were 31 
greenfields and 58 acquisitions compared to 56 greenfields and 14 acquisitions in the Chinese 
sub sample. Thus, the Finnish sub sample contained more acquisitions and less greenfields than 
the Chinese one. 
Regarding the country of origin of the parent company, our total sample contained Western 
MNCs from the Nordic countries (57 MNCs), Western Europe (38 MNCs) and the US (64 MNCs). 
The following nations of origin were represented in the Finnish sample: Sweden (21 parent com-
panies), Denmark (7), Norway (4), United Kingdom (4), Germany (5), the Netherlands (4), Russia 
(1), Belgium (1), France (2), Liechtenstein (1), Switzerland (9) and USA (30). The corresponding 
numbers for the Chinese sample were: Finland (12), Sweden (8), Denmark (1), Norway (3), the 
United Kingdom (3), German (12), the Netherlands (3), France (11), Italy (3), Austria (1), Switzer-
land (8) and USA (5). 
In our data collection, we used a structured interview technique. In the first stage of the data 
collection process a letter was sent to subsidiary presidents, in which the project was described 
and the confidentiality of the responses was emphasized. Then, the respondents were contacted 
by telephone to agree on times for the interviews. The length of each structured face-to face in-
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terview was 45–120 minutes, during which the respondent and the researchers went through the 
questionnaire together. Although English was used as the questionnaire language, Finnish, Swed-
ish, or Mandarin were also used to explain certain terms or expressions that the respondents had 
difficulty understanding. Taking the time to conduct the survey in this kind of way is compen-
sated by the increased reliability of the resulting data as opposed to data collected by for instance 
mail survey (Andersson, Forsgren and Holm, 2001). 
Following previous studies (Foss and Pedersen, 2002), we targeted the president of each 
subsidiary for our interviews. This choice is motivated by the fact that we consider subsidiary 
presidents to be directly involved in the subsidiary’s operations and therefore in a more favorable 
position than other actors to provide an overall picture of the subsidiary. Thus, our data consists 
of single responses from the presidents of each subsidiary. We use a perceptive measure that 
provides us with the various subsidiary presidents’ subjective views. We think that subsidiary 
presidents as key decision makers can be considered to have the best overall view of the subsid-
iary while the view of lower level functional managers could be more restricted. Our choice to 
use a single respondent was mainly due to practical reasons, as it would have been extremely 
difficult to gain access to multiple respondents within each subsidiary. Furthermore, whilst the 
use of multiple respondents can pose certain advantages in the shape of increased reliability, it 
is not unproblematic due to possible interrater reliability problems. 
Dependent Variables
Outward knowledge transfer. Following the approach of Gupta and Govindarajan (2000), Holm 
and Pedersen (2000) and Schulz (2001), we assessed the outward knowledge transfer from the 
subsidiary by asking respondents to rate the extent to which the subsidiary’s distinctive compe-
tence had been used by other units of the MNC during the last three years. We measured this as 
the mean of five different organizational functions: general management, manufacturing, market-
ing/sales, service, and R&D. The respondents were asked to answer separately for each of the 
functions on a seven-point Likert scale where 1 = very much lower, and 7 = very much higher. 
Although there is no clear theoretical argument as to why the different functions should constitute 
one construct, we have nonetheless decided to examine them as one variable as they do co-vary 
empirically. In our sample this is indicated by the fact that all functions load on the same factor 
and have a relatively high Cronbach’s alpha of .81. 
Independent Variables
Mode of Entry. Acquired subsidiaries, as opposed to greenfield subsidiaries, can from the start be 
expected to possess a knowledge stock that is less duplicative to that of the rest of the MNC (Gupta 
and Govindarajan, 2000; Hennart and Park, 1993). We argue that the non-duplicative nature of 
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subsidiary knowledge may pose an advantage for outward knowledge transfer. Following this line 
of reasoning, we used entry mode as our independent variable. The respondents were asked to 
state whether the subsidiary had been established through acquisition or greenfield investment. 
We coded their answers into a dummy variable where acquisitions received the value of 1 and 
greenfield investments the value of 0. 
Time elapsed since the subsidiary became a part of the MNC. Time elapsed was measured by 
asking the respondents how many years the subsidiary had been in the MNC. The answers were 
divided into four different groups, 0–5 years elapsed since acquisition, > 5 years elapsed since 
acquisition, 0–5 years elapsed since greenfield investment and > 5 years elapsed since greenfield 
investment. We created dummy variables for the first three groups that were then compared to 
the fourth group. We labeled the dummy variables as follows: 0–5 years elapsed since acquisition; 
> 5 years elapsed since acquisition; 0–5 years elapsed since greenfield investment. The limit of 5 
years has been used in previous acquisition studies (Krug and Hegarty, 1997) to represent the 
length of the acquisition integration process. Although this is a rather crude division, it gives in-
dication of whether newer acquisitions differ from older ones. Greenfield investments were di-
vided to two groups as well in order to control that there was no similar time effect in them. 
Control Variables 
Inward knowledge transfer. In order to control for subsidiary’s access to internal knowledge 
sources within the MNC, we measured the inward transfer of corporate knowledge to a subsidiary. 
Similarly to Schulz (2001), internal knowledge transfer to a subsidiary was determined by asking 
respondents to rate the extent to which the subsidiary had used the distinctive competence of 
other units within the corporation during the last three years. We measured this as the mean of 
five different organizational functions; general management, manufacturing, marketing/sales, 
service, and R&D. The respondents were asked to answer separately for each of the functions on 
a seven-point Likert scale where 1 = very much lower, and 7 = very much higher. As with our 
dependent variable we decided to examine the different functions as one variable as they do co-
vary empirically. All functions loaded on the same factor and had a Cronbach’s alpha of .63
Knowledge stock of the subsidiary. A stock of knowledge that is superior to the knowledge 
of other units could increase outward knowledge transfer. For knowledge exchange to take place, 
knowledge worth sharing needs to exist (Schulz, 2001). Knowledge superior to that of other cor-
porate units is the knowledge that could be especially valuable to share. Thus, a subsidiary with 
a unique knowledge stock is likely to be an attractive collaboration partner (Davenport and 
Prusak, 1998). We therefore controlled for the knowledge stock of the subsidiary, which was 
operationalized as the extent to which the subsidiary during the last three years had developed 
knowledge that was superior compared to that of other units in the business area. We measured 
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this as the mean of five different organizational functions; general management, manufacturing, 
marketing/sales, service, and R&D. The respondents were asked to answer separately for each of 
the functions on a seven-point Likert scale where 1 = very much lower, and 7 = very much 
higher. This construct had a Cronbach’s alpha of .69.
Tacitness of knowledge. Tacitness is one of the most commonly discussed barriers to internal 
knowledge transfer (Zander and Kogut 1995). Thus, we considered it important to control for the 
tacitness of knowledge in our study. The respondents were asked how easy it is to explain sub-
sidiary knowledge to others and how easy is this knowledge for others to understand based on a 
verbal presentation. The respondents answered each of the two questions on a Likert scale where 
1 corresponded to ”very easy” and 7 corresponded to ”very difficult. The Cronbach’s alpha for 
this construct was .86. 
Region of origin of the parent company.1 The region of origin of the MNC can influence the 
way the MNC operates. For example, in the study by Gupta and Govindarajan (2000) subsidiaries 
of Japanese MNCs tended to engage in less outward knowledge transfer to peer subsidiaries 
compared to subsidiaries of US and European MNCs. Thus, we controlled for whether the region 
of origin of the parent company had an impact on outward knowledge transfer since this could 
have equal influence or even a more significant influence than the entry mode.2 In our sample, 
we divided the parent companies into the following three groups based on their region of origin: 
the Nordic countries, the rest of Europe, and the USA. Therefore, we built three dummy variables 
representing the region of origin of the parent company. We chose the Nordic countries as the 
base case to which the two other dummy variables representing the USA and the rest of Europe 
were compared. 
Location of the subsidiary. Our empirical data is based on samples collected from two coun-
tries: foreign subsidiaries of Western MNCs in Finland and China. There could be a difference in 
outward knowledge transfer depending on whether the subsidiary is located in Finland or China. 
It is feasible that due to larger cultural differences, the Chinese subsidiaries possess knowledge 
that is different from the knowledge of the rest of the MNC and that it thus could be of value. On 
the other hand, it is possible that since Finland is a more developed country than China, the 
Finnish subsidiaries could possess technologically superior knowledge compared to the Chinese 
subsidiaries and thus be able to contribute more to the outward knowledge transfer. Thus, we 
1 We chose to control for the region of origin of the parent company instead of country of origin because we saw 
this sufficient for our controlling purposes. Another possibility would have been to control for each individual coun-
try of origin. However, since the number of countries included in the study was large (15 countries), including them 
individually would have increased the number of variables in the model to a degree that would have been unsup-
portable considering our sample size. 
2 It is possible that the country of origin could also have an indirect effect on outward knowledge transfer through 
entry mode since MNCs may prefer acquisitions or greenfield investments based on their country of origin. 
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controlled for the location of the subsidiary to see whether outward knowledge transfer differed 
depending on whether the subsidiary was located in Finland or China. We constructed a dummy 
variable by giving the value 0 to the Finnish subsidiaries the value 1 to the Chinese sub-
sidiaries. 
Profitability. Profitability can be used as an indicator of a successful operation. We argue 
that it is feasible that there will be greater interest in obtaining outward knowledge from a suc-
cessful subsidiary than from a less successful one. Profitability of the subsidiary during the last 
12 months was measured using a seven-point Likert scale where 1 = poor, and 7 = excellent. We 
used self-reported performance measures because there is evidence supporting the general reli-
ability of self-reported performance measures (Venkatraman and Ramanujam, 1986). 
Size of the subsidiary. On one hand, larger firms may have more resources and thus be able 
to engage in more outward knowledge transfer than smaller firms. There is evidence that outflows 
of knowledge tend to be higher for larger subsidiaries (Gupta and Govindarajan, 2000). On the 
other hand there may exist diseconomies of scale when transferring resources (Barkema and 
Vermeulen, 1998). For example, Ranft and Lord (2002) found that communication in large ac-
quisitions was more difficult. Communication problems may in turn complicate outward knowl-
edge transfer. Due to this evidence of the possible impact of size on outward knowledge transfer, 
following Gupta and Govindarajan (2000) we controlled for the size of the subsidiary by measur-
ing the number of employees in the subsidiary. 
RESULTS
We chose a multiple regression analyses as our analysis method because it provides a means of 
objectively assessing the degree and character of the relationship between dependent and inde-
pendent variables by forming the variate of independent variables (Hair, Anderson, Tatham, and 
Black, 1998). Thus, regression analysis enabled us to assess the magnitude and direction (positive 
or negative) of our hypothesized relationships.3 
We used forced entry, also known as standard multiple regression. In standard multiple re-
gression, all independent variables are entered into the regression equation at once. Each inde-
pendent variable is evaluated in terms of what it adds to the prediction of the dependent variable 
that is different from the predictability provided by all the other independent variables (Tabachnick 
and Fidell, 1989). We chose this method because it is recommended for assessing relationships 
3 To test the robustness of the results across different multivariate methods, we tested hypothesis 1 also with logisti-
cal regression. The results of standard multiple regression and logistical regression were essentially similar. 
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among variables and answering the basic question of multiple correlation when there is no par-
ticular reason for using hierarchical or stepwise regression methods (Tabachnick and Fidell, 
1989). 
We built two regression models to test each of our two hypotheses separately. Table 1 pro-
vides descriptive statistics and correlation matrix for the variables used in the first regression 
model. In table 2 the respective information is given concerning the second regression model. 
There are some interesting correlations worth noting. The negative correlation between the 
location of the subsidiary and the entry mode reflected the fact that our Chinese sample included 
relatively more greenfield investments than acquisitions compared to our Finnish sample. This 
could possibly indicate a propensity of MNCs to establish greenfields in China and acquisitions 
in Finland. 
Location of the subsidiary was also correlated with inward knowledge transfer suggesting 
that Chinese subsidiaries engaged in more inward knowledge transfer than Finnish ones. This 
could follow from the fact that Chinese subsidiaries were more often established as greenfield 
investements than the Finnish ones. Inward transfer of knowledge has been related particularly 
to greenfield investments (Gupta and Govindarajan, 2000). Indeed, in our analysis as well, entry 
through greenfield investment was somewhat correlated with increased transfer of inward knowl-
edge. In addition, we found a strong correlation between inward knowledge transfer and sub-
sidiary knowledge stock. This suggests a possible interaction effect between these two variables. 
Finally, profitability was correlated with subsidiary knowledge stock indicating that subsidiaries 
with large stocks of knowledge were more profitable than the ones with a smaller knowledge 
stock. Or alternatively, subsidiaries that were profitable were able to invest in the development 
of large stocks of knowledge. 
We then examined both correlation matrices to identify possible collinearity between inde-
pendent variables. Including dummy variables in the model can create a situation of high multi-
collinearity (Hair et al., 1998). However, there were no high correlations of .90 or above present 
in our models to suggest serious collinearity problem (Hair et al., 1998). 
We further examined multicollinearity with the help of multicollinearity statistics. Based on 
the variance inflation factor (VIF), tolerance, and condition index no serious multicollinearity 
problems existed in either one of our regression models. The dummy variable ”0–5 years since 
greenfield investment” had the lowest tolerance value (tolerance = .29) and correspondingly the 
highest variance inflation factor value (VIF = 3.40). Nevertheless, the tolerance was still well 
above the recommended threshold of 0.1 and the VIF value was well below the common thresh-
old of 10.0 (Hair et al., 1998). The highest condition index was 19.34 for the last dimension in 
the second regression model, which fell under the most commonly used threshold value of 30 
(Hair et al., 1998). We also checked the data for possible outliers. We detected no outliers over 
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the recommended threshold of 1.96, which is the critical t value at the .05 confidence level (Hair 
et al., 1998). 
Table 3 presents the results of our first regression model that we built to test our first hypoth-
esis. The model was significant as indicated by a significant F-value (F = 11.94, p < .001). The 
percentage of total variance explained was 42% (R2 = .42). 
TABLE 3. Regression model.
Independent Variable Standardized t-value
 Beta Coefficient
Entry mode (Greenfield investment = 0, Acquisition = 1) .236*** 3.29
Inward transfer of knowledge .409*** 6.02
Knowledge stock of the subsidiary .345*** 5.25
Tacitness of knowledge –.039 –.603
Region of origin of the parent company (Western Europe) .006 .081
Region of origin of the parent company (USA) –.066 –.884
Location of the subsidiary (Finland = 0, China = 1) –.119 –1.48
Profitability .207** 3.20
Size of the subsidiary .033 .518
R .647
R square .419
Adjusted R square .384
F 11.937***
+ p< .10 * p< .05, ** p<0.01, ***p<.001
All one-tailed tests.
Data in the table present standardized regression coefficients.
Concerning our first hypothesis, we proposed that outward transfer of knowledge from the 
subsidiary to other parts of the MNC would be greater from an acquired subsidiary than from a 
subsidiary started as a greenfield investment. We found strong support for this. The entry mode 
variable was positive and significant (standardized β = .24**) indicating that outward knowledge 
transfer was significantly greater from acquired subsidiaries compared to subsidiaries established 
as greenfield investments. 
Regarding the control variables, both inward transfer of knowledge (standardized β = .41***) 
and knowledge stock of the subsidiary (standardized β = .35***) had a highly significant positive 
relationship on outward transfer of knowledge. Profitability (standardized β = .21**) was also 
somewhat positively related to outward transfer of knowledge. Contrary to our expectations, 
tacitness of knowledge, region of origin of the parent company, location of the subsidiary, and 
size of the subsidiary were insignificant. 
The results of our second regression model can be seen in table 4. The model was significant 
(F = 9.64, p < .001) and explained 42% of the variance (R2 = .42). In the second regression 
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TABLE 4. Regression model.
Independent Variable Standardized t-value
 Beta Coefficient
0–5 years since acquisition .082 .772
>5 years since acquisition .281** 2.76
0–5 years since greenfield investment –.311** –2.69
Inward transfer of knowledge .387*** 5.60
Knowledge stock of the subsidiary .342*** 5.16
Tacitness of knowledge –.044 –.662
Region of origin of the parent company (Western Europe) –.030 –.404
Region of origin of the parent company (USA) –.079 –1.046
Location of the subsidiary (Finland = 0, China = 1) –.112 –1.355
Profitability .208** 3.190
Size of the subsidiary .013 .200
R .647
R square .419
Adjusted R square .376
F 9.644***
+ p < .10 * p < .05, ** p < 0.01, ***p < .001
All one-tailed tests.
Data in the table present standardized regression coefficients.
model we tested our second hypothesis suggesting that knowledge transfer from an acquired 
subsidiary would increase after 5 years whereas there would be no such effect in greenfield in-
vestments. We further divided the entry mode variable that was used in the first model into a 
categorical variable including the following categories: 0–5 years since acquisition, >5 years since 
acquisition, 0–5 years since greenfield investment, and > 5 years since greenfield investment. We 
chose the category of > 5 years since greenfield investment as the base variable to which the 
other three categories were compared. 
The results of the second regression analysis showed partial support for our hypothesis 2. 
Outward transfer of knowledge was indeed greater in acquisitions that were older than 5 years 
old compared to younger acquisitions.4 However, whereas we supposed that there would be no 
similar effect concerning greenfield investments, we found a similar effect. Outward transfer of 
knowledge was greater in greenfield investments that were older than 5 years compared to 
younger greenfield investments. 
4 We ran an additional test to see whether we could establish a linear positive relationship between outward knowl-
edge transfer in acquisitions and time elapsed, which would have represented a result very similar to Bresman et al. 
(1999). We did establish a positive relationship but it was non-significant. 
527
T H E  I M P A C T  O F  E N T R Y  M O D E  I N  O U T W A R D  K N O W L E D G E  T R A N S F E R  I N  MNC S :  …
The impacts of the control variables were similar to the first regression model. Inward trans-
fer of knowledge (standardized β = .39***), knowledge stock of the subsidiary (standardized β = 
.34***), and profitability (standardized β = .21**), were positively related to outward transfer of 
knowledge. Tacitness of knowledge, region of origin of the parent company, location of the sub-
sidiary, and size of the subsidiary remained insignificant. 
CONCLUSIONS
Our first objective was to examine the impact of entry mode, i.e. greenfield investments and 
acquisitions, on outward knowledge transfer from a subsidiary unit to other parts of the MNC. 
We showed that outward knowledge transfer to other parts of the MNC is significantly greater in 
subsidiaries established through acquisition than by means of greenfield investment. Our empiri-
cal data from Finland and China provided an additional contribution by showing that the influence 
of entry mode on outward knowledge transfer was greater than the influence of home country.
Thus, similarly to Gupta and Govindarajan (2000) our study implies that acquisitions may 
enable greater outward transfer to the rest of the MNC than greenfield investments. The theoreti-
cal conclusions of this finding are that the choice of entry mode has clear implications on outward 
knowledge transfer. Our study suggests that these implications can be more important than factors 
such as subsidiary home country or home region of the parent company. Therefore, the implica-
tions of entry mode on outward knowledge transfer could be included in the existing literature 
on the choice of entry mode that is currently to a large extent based on transaction cost theory. 
Our study suggests that the knowledge-based view could explain the choice and implications of 
entry mode choice as well. 
Our second objective was to explore the impact of time elapsed since the subsidiary became 
a part of the MNC on outward knowledge transfer. We showed that outward knowledge transfer 
increased if the acquired subsidiary had been in the MNC for more than five years. This finding 
is in principle accordance with Bresman et al. (1999) who established a positive relationship 
between time elapsed and knowledge transfer. However, our study suggests that the relationship 
might actually not be strictly linear but that there is a clear difference between acquisitions 
younger than five years and older than five years. We acknowledge that this time limit although 
based on previous research is somewhat crude and more specific knowledge of the exact time 
limit would require curve fitting. Nevertheless, the theoretical conclusion that can be made is 
that outward knowledge transfer from acquisitions is a process that requires time. From this fol-
lows a methodological conclusion that if the performance of an acquisition is measured as the 
amount of outward knowledge transfer, this should be measured only after enough time has 
elapsed since the acquisition.
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Contrary to our expectations, we found a similar time effect also in greenfield investments 
whereas we argued that this would not be the case since in greenfield there is no time consuming 
post-acquisition integration process. Our findings imply, however, that outward knowledge trans-
fer takes time also in subsidiaries established as greenfield investments. This could be due to the 
fact that for knowledge exchange to take place, knowledge worth sharing needs to exist (Schulz, 
2001). For a subsidiary established as a greenfield investment time may be required to create a 
knowledge stock that is of value to the other parts of the MNC and thus worth sharing. The first 
few years of greenfield investments may well be marked by inward knowledge transfer from the 
headquarters to the subsidiary. In conclusion, although outward knowledge transfer seems to 
increase in both entry modes, the reasons for this are likely to differ. 
The implications of this study are tentative and offer several avenues for future research. 
Since the focus of this study was to demonstrate possible variation in knowledge transfer depend-
ing on entry mode and time, the different mechanisms and factors causing this variation remain 
unexplored in our study. Additional clarifying work is required as to why there is variation in 
knowledge transfer depending on entry mode and time elapsed. It would be of interest to con-
centrate on, for instance, knowledge transfer mechanisms and how they vary in subsidiaries es-
tablished through different entry modes. Another interesting issue would be to further explore the 
impact of time elapsed. Our study suggests that the relationship between the impact of time and 
outward knowledge transfer could be non-linear. That raises the question as to which form the 
curve takes and whether it differs across entry modes. 
Our study has certain limitations. Firstly, we have chosen to focus only on outward knowl-
edge transfer to be able to better clarify certain aspects of the complex knowledge transfer proc-
ess. Nevertheless, we realize that it is an inter-related, two-way process, which also comprises 
inward knowledge transfer. Secondly, we have considered outward knowledge transfer to the 
MNC as a whole entity, not separating between different corporate levels such as peer subsidiary 
units and headquarters. Thirdly, our study may contain some western bias as we have restricted 
ourselves to studying western MNCs. Finally, we also acknowledge the problem of drawing infer-
ences about causality with cross-sectional data, which is inherent in these types of studies. 
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